



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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

Top Secret

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15 March 1967

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Information as of 1600
15 March 1967

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I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:

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A new artillery regi-
ment may have been assigned to COSVN
The weekly re-
view of South Vietnam battle statistics (Para. 5).

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II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:

During a private meeting with assembly leaders on 15 March, military leaders raised expected objections to the assembly's draft constitution, but apparently were not too explicit (Paras. 1-2). Premier Ky told newsmen on 15 March that he and other ranking GVN officials will meet with President Johnson at Guam next week (Para. 3). Efforts to revive the Buddhist "struggle" movement in I Corps have not drawn much public support thus far (Paras. 4-7).

III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:

There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. Communist Political Developments:

The Liberation Front has launched a propaganda drive to commemorate the Communist demonstration in Saigon on 19 March 1950 against the arrival of the first US aid to the French (Paras. 1-2).

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ANNEX

South Vietnam Battle Statistics
1963 to week of 5-11 March 1967

- Weapons and Personnel Losses
- Viet Cong Attacks and Incidents

15 March 1967



I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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NVA 84A Artillery Regiment Assigned to COSVN

3. A new artillery regiment may have been assigned to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) according to several enemy documents recently uncovered in northern Tay Ninh Province. One of the documents, a personal notebook, made frequent reference to the 84th unit in the area. The North Vietnamese Army 84A Artillery Regiment left the North in March 1966 and arrived in South Vietnam last August.

4. This 1,200-man unit was confirmed by MACV last October, but has since been unlocated in the III Corps area. Several intelligence sources, including a returnee, suggest that the unit is equipped with recoilless rifles, apparently to increase the VC's capability against the large US armored units introduced into III Corps last year.

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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

5. The week of 5-11 March compared with the week of 26 Feb - 4 March:

I. Viet Cong Incidents

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>26 Feb - 4 March</u>	<u>5-11 March</u>
Attacks	36	54
Regimental.	0	0
Company	2	2
Harassment	404	370
Terrorism	25	22
Sabotage	4	12
Propaganda	21	6
Antiaircraft	<u>311</u>	<u>229</u>
TOTAL INCIDENTS	801	693

II. Casualties

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>
Killed	1,736	1,407	199	263
Wounded	-----	-----	505	593
Missing/ Captured	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>101</u>
TOTALS	1,736	1,407	722	957

	<u>US</u>		<u>FREE WORLD</u>	
	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>
Killed	231	175	6	Not
Wounded	1,377	892	25	Reported
Missing/ Captured	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	
TOTALS	1,608	1,067	31	

*Field reporting of enemy captured figures is now based on a monthly count of POWs held in POW camps. Figures for enemy captured will thus be incorporated in the monthly "Personnel Losses" chart which appears in the Situation in South Vietnam.

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III. Weapons Captured

	<u>VC/NVA</u>		<u>GVN</u>	
	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>	<u>26 Feb-4 Mar</u>	<u>5-11 Mar</u>
Individual	462	Not	103	273
Crew-Served	<u>49</u>	Reported	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTALS	511		104	280

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. According to the US Embassy, military leaders proposed changes in seven individual provisions of the assembly's draft constitution during a private meeting with assembly leaders on 14 March. The most important of these changes concerned the election of province chiefs, the right of the future national assembly to vote no-confidence in the government, and the transitional roles of the Constituent Assembly and the ruling Military Directorate.

2. The atmosphere of the meeting on the 14th reportedly was rather heated, with the controversy narrowing down primarily to the issue of the assembly's role during the interim period before new governmental institutions are elected. Directorate Secretary General Chieu has indicated to a US Embassy officer that the Directorate will be willing to accept the assembly's draft on other points at issue and to devise some role for assembly members in drafting electoral laws and supervising the elections. The Directorate is strongly opposed, however, to the assembly's assuming interim legislative power, and believes the current government arrangements should be extended until the elected government takes office. The assembly is expected to reply to the Directorate's proposals on 16 March, and the embassy continues to believe a satisfactory compromise is possible. Reported plans of top government officials to participate in the Guam conference could, however, encourage the assembly to stall.

GVN Leaders Reportedly Scheduled to Meet President Johnson at Guam

3. While on a tour of the Mekong Delta on 15 March, Premier Ky told newsmen that he had been invited by Ambassador Lodge to meet with President Johnson at Guam next week. The Vietnamese Government delegation reportedly will consist of some 15 or 20 persons, and in addition to Ky, will include Chief of State Thieu, Foreign Minister Do, information minister General Tri, and revolutionary development minister General Thang.

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Political Developments in I Corps

4. Efforts to revive the Buddhist "struggle" movement are under way in Hue and Thua Thien Province, but have not drawn much public support thus far. The bulk of last year's "struggle" movement participants, cyclo drivers, students, and market women, are apparently not taking part for fear of being arrested and of incurring, in the case of the nonstudents, government economic retaliation. In general, local authorities have acted forcefully to stop attempted "struggle" activity; several leaders, mostly students, have been arrested and may be brought to trial soon. Local authorities continue to believe that they can handle the situation provided they receive support from Saigon.

5. The attitudes of the "struggle" leaders themselves, however, may be another significant reason for their not taking more overt action at present. Although some of the more militant leaders are attempting to inspire strikes or demonstrations, Tri Quang remains the most influential figure in the movement, and he apparently has not favored the resumption of a public "struggle."

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Other such influential "struggle" leaders as Thich Mat Nguyen are also reported to be refraining from involvement in "struggle" efforts at present.

6. The current situation could become somewhat complicated by the province-wide conflict between the Dai Viet Nationalist party and one faction of the Nationalist (VNQDD) Party which contains many supporters of former I Corps commander General Nguyen Chanh Thi. The VNQDD faction fears that the Dai Viets are becoming too strong

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in the province, and may also believe that a Buddhist victory could hasten General Thi's return to Vietnam. Both of these factors may well lead to increasing cooperation between the VNQDD faction and the Buddhists.

7. The means which the Buddhists may employ in an attempt to increase their political strength have not become clear. A new full-scale "struggle" is always possible, although it is rather doubtful in view of last year's failure unless preceded by major political changes in Saigon. On the other hand, Tri Quang and his allies could decide to sponsor or support candidates for the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Should the Buddhists adopt the latter, and more legal, course of action, local authorities might find themselves hard pressed to prevent the election of a significant number of Buddhist-backed representatives.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS


1. The Liberation Front has launched a propaganda drive to celebrate the anniversary of "anti-US national day" which commemorates the Communist demonstration in Saigon on 19 March 1950 against the arrival of the first US aid to the French. The Front central committee has set aside the week of 16-22 March as a time for the "people of all strata" to hold meetings, to study propaganda, and to intensify the military and political struggle against the US.

2. Specifically, the populace has been instructed to step up the movement to destroy US troops and equipment, to foment discontent within the South Vietnamese forces, and to disseminate widely all forms of propaganda. This year's celebration of the anniversary, while more extensive and detailed than those held previously, does not appear to present any grave threat to US forces.


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Weapons Losses



Personnel Losses (Excluding Wounded)







US Casualties to Date: Killed 7,667 Wounded 44,088 Captured 141 Missing 373

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*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 12 February, the weekly figure will represent only personnel killed. The adjacent monthly chart will continue to reflect killed, missing and captured.

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